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DUBIOUS INTERPRETATIVE RULES FOR 
CONSTRUING FEDERAL TAXING STATUTES 
Richard A. Westin* 
INTRODUCTION 
Knowing even a substantial portion of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1954 is a major achievement. Divining how the courts might react to a 
complex tax transaction is also terribly difficult, but for this ability law-
yers are often well-rewarded on earth. The tools of this esoteric trade in-
clude a mass of interpretative rules of a most uncertain nature, as sophis-
ticated tax advisors are well aware. This article discusses the application 
and limits of a litany of the interpretative rules. The rules are frequently 
applicable outside the tax field, but the following study is confined to 
their application to tax decisions. If the tone of the article seems mocking 
or irreverent, that tone is ultimately unintended. Judges, including those 
on our United States Supreme Court, face a dismal flood of overwhelm-
ingly complex tax cases which must in fact be decided; and the decisions 
frequently require makeweights or ready-made rationales for reaching a 
particular result. The major villain in this story is Congress, with its spe-
cialized committees which fail to consider fully or explain the purposes of 
complicated legislation. Lesser villains might include those members of 
the legal and accounting professions who structure transactions laden 
with doubt but know that there is a slight chance of prevailing or of forc-
ing the government to accept an economically sound settlement. Further-
more, there is always the possibility that the Internal Revenue Service's 
audit personnel may not discover the issue in the first place. 
The rules discussed in this article were selected either because they 
are particularly pervasive (reenactment, traps for the unwary, and the 
presumptive correctness of regulations) or because they reflect curious ju-
dicial attitudes towards the treatment of complex tax matters (respect for 
* B.A., M.B.A., Columbia College; J.D., University of Pennsylvania. Associate Professor 
of Law, illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago-Kent College of Law. Member, California 
and Vermont Bars. 
1 
2 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17 
legislated conditions, placement of the burden on the draftsman, and 
symmetry). As a final matter, the article suggests several proposals for 
reforming some or all of the interpretative rules. 
1. SELECTED RULES OF INTERPRETATION 
A. Reenactment 
According to the reenactment doctrine, Congress implicitly validates 
judicial and administrative interpretations of legislation when it reenacts 
that legislation. l The doctrine relies upon the fiction that reenactment 
results from Congressional consideration and approval of at least some of 
the previous interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code. The doctrine 
has a limit, however: reenactment does not preclude future changes in 
administrative and judicial interpretations through the exercise of the 
rule-making powers of the ms.s 
A relevant question concerns the force that is actually accorded to 
the doctrine in tax cases, and an answer may be found in a sampling of 
the United States Supreme Court's statements of the rule. The reader 
will likely conclude that the doctrine means whatever the writer wants it 
, to mean. S At one extreme is the position announced by the Court in 
Helvering v. Winmill' that "[t]reasury regulations and interpretations 
long continued without substantial change, applying to unamended or 
substantially reenacted statutes, are deemed to have received congres-
sional approval and have the effect of law."11 At the opposite extreme, the 
Court takes a more flexible view, regarding reenactment as no more than 
an implication of Congressional approval. For example, the Court in 
Helvering v. Bliss,S taking this rather timorous approach, stated that the 
"reenactment ... of the sections permitting the deduction indicate [sic] 
1. See generally Brown, Regulations, Reenactment and the Revenue Acts, 54 HARv. 
L. REV. 377 (1941); Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem, 54 HARv. L. REv. 398 
(1941); Paul, Use and Abuse of Tax Regulations in Statutory Construction, 49 YALE L.J. 
660 (1940); Surrey, The Scope and Effect of Treasury Regulations Under the Income, 
Estate and Gift Taxes, 88 U. PA. L. REv. 556 (1940). 
2. Helvering v. Wilshire Oil Co., 308 U.S. 90, 100 (1939). 
3. Lewis Carroll understood this concept long ago: 
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, "it means 
just what I choose it to mean-neither more or less." 
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many 
different things." 
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master-that's all." 
L. CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND-THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 230 
(Doubleday 1960). 
4. 305 U.S. 79 (1938). 
5. Id. at 83 (emphasis added). 
Since the legislative approval of existing regulations by reenactments of the stat-
utory provision to which they appertain gives such regulations the force of law, 
we think that Congress did not intend to authorize the Treasury to repeal the 
rule of law that existed during the period for which the tax is imposed. 
Helvering v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 116 (1939) (emphasis added). 
6. 293 U.S. 144 (1934). 
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Congressional approval of this administrative interpretation.""
The reenactment rule is subject to some qualifications. For instance,
in Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner8 the Court indicated it is important
that the administrative interpretation be consistent with the statute and
judicial interpretations of the statute:
Administrative practice may be of persuasive weight in determining the
construction of a statute of doubtful meaning where the practice does
not conflict with other provisions of the statute and is not so inconsis-
tent with applicable decisions of the courts as to produce inconsistency
and confusion in the administration of the law.9
Congress cannot grant an administrative agency the power to make law;
instead, the agency merely has the power to carry out the intention of
Congress as shown by the statute.10 In other words, "[a] regulation which
. . . operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute. . . is a
mere nullity."1 In at least one example, however, the Court has followed
an inconsistent administrative position, finding it well-reasoned and is-
sued pursuant to actual Congressional intent.1 2
The Court has also indicated that an unpublished interpretative reg-
ulation cannot be approved by Congress through reenactment. 3 In San-
ford the Court suggested that it does not give effect to unpublished ad-
ministrative regulations on which taxpayers could not have relied.' 4 Such
a view seems unrealistic since, in fact, Congress cannot and does not re-
view the full administrative and judicial gloss at the time of reenactment.
Yet this limitation suggests that Congress could have reviewed it, without
demanding that it did. If Congress wanted to learn of unpublished Trea-
sury practices, it certainly has the investigative power to do so--perhaps
this power underlies the fiction of reenactment.
A similar limitation is the logical but potentially devasting require-
ment that Congress actually has been aware of the administrative gloss at
the time of reenactment. In Leary v. United States' 5 the Court found
7. Id. at 151 (emphasis added).
8. 308 U.S. 39 (1939).
9. Id. at 52.
10. Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936).
11. Id.
12. In United States v. Reynolds, 250 U.S. 104 (1919), the Court said:
This ruling was made in the year 1910, and may be inconsistent with some previ-
ous rulings of the Department, as counsel for respondent insists that it is. Never-
theless it is entitled to weight as an administrative interpretation of the act; it
comports with our impression of the natural meaning of the language employed
by Congress; and it very probably was relied upon by the President ....
This construction of the Act... puts it in agreement with other acts..
which, while subsequently passed and perhaps not strictly to be regarded as a
legislative interpretation, nevertheless seem to us to indicate the effect that Con-
gress attributed to the Act ....
Id. at 109-10.
13. Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 52 (1939).
14. Id.
15. 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
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that regulations were not effectively adopted through reenactment be-
cause the accompanying legislative history gave no hint that Congress
knew of the particular regulations when it passed the new law.1 6 The
Court conceded, however, that "congressional re-enactment of a statute,
even without any apparent knowledge of a particular regulation, can
'strengthen to some extent' the regulation's claim to validity, but re-en-
actment cannot save a regulation which 'contradict[s] the requirements'
of the statute itself."1 7
Yet another qualification to the doctrine concerns the number of
changes Congress makes in a statute upon reenactment. Obviously, Con-
gress indicates disapproval of present applications of a law when it makes
wholesale changes in the statute. 8 The proper test is whether Congress
reenacts the statute without "material" or "substantial" change. 9 Finally,
the Court also mentions the following prerequisites to use of the reenact-
ment doctrine: the interpretations must have been long continued with-
out major change;20 the regulation must be interpreting an ambiguous
statute;21 and the regulation must be fair to both the government and the
taxpayer.2
2
A restatement of the doctrine of reenactment might be as follows:
Judicial or administrative interpretations of a Code section will be given
legal weight when the related Code section is reenacted, the Code section
is ambiguous and enacted without material change, and the interpreta-
tion is longstanding, published, consistent with the statute, desirable, and
known to Congress at the time of reenactment. Such a constricted rule is
credible only to the naive. The rule is in fact flexible in practice, and it
appears to operate more as a means for reaching a result already decided
upon rather than as a true basis for decision. Accordingly, it is a highly
unpredictable doctrine, available in different formulations to either side
of a controversy. If it were applied in its most distilled form, it could win
a case on its own merits. More likely, however, the doctrine will be used
by both sides in the form most attractive to each, freeing the court to do
whatever it wants with respect to application of the reenactment doctrine
to the case.
B. Traps for the Unwary
The "traps for the unwary" doctrine states that the courts should not
16. Id. at 24.
17. Id. at 24-25 (quoting Massachusetts Trustees v. United States, 377 U.S. 235, 241-
42 (1964)).
18. See Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 (1940); Rasquin v. Humphreys, 308 U.S. 54
(1939).
19. Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 (1938) (substantial change); Hartley v. Com-
missioner, 295 U.S. 216, 220 (1935) (material change).
20. Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 (1938); National Lead Co. v. United States,
252 U.S. 140 (1930).
21. See Iselin v. United States, 270 U.S. 245, 250-51 (1926).
22. Estate of Sanford v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 39, 51 (1939); Burnet v. Chicago
Portrait Co., 285 U.S. 1, 16 (1932).
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develop interpretations of the Code that are so complicated that only so-
phisticated (wealthy) taxpayers can take advantage of those interpreta-
tions. Application of the doctrine is rare.
In McWilliams v. Commissioner s the Supreme Court faced a tax-
payer who had seemingly navigated his way around section 24(b) of the
1939 Code,2 4 which barred the deduction of losses on sales between re-
lated taxpayers, by his selling stock on the public market followed by a
purchase of stock of the same issuer in the name of his spouse.25 The
admitted purpose of the sale and purchase was to create a tax loss for the
year.26 The Court was caught in a complicated interpretative web as the
taxpayer and the government clashed over the relationship of section
24(b) to the "wash sales" rules27 and the risks associated with an overly
broad judicial decision.28 The Court finally concluded that section 24(b)
did apply to a sale through an exchange or intermediary, stating that to
hold otherwise "would have converted the section into a mere trap for the
unwary. 2 9 The Court did not completely explain its reasoning. Presuma-
bly, the Court meant that if it supported the taxpayer's position that sec-
tion 24(b) did not apply, then only the unsophisticated, uncounseled tax-
payer would lose the deduction because of section 24(b).
On the other hand, the doctrine is not always recognized. There is
perhaps no better example of this than the Central Tablet Manufactur-
ing Co. v. United States0 decision, in which the Supreme Court dealt
with an unfortunate accrual-method taxpayer whose business facilities
had burned to the ground. 1 Some time after the fire, the taxpayer re-
ceived insurance proceeds in excess of its basis in the property.3 2 The tax-
payer then decided to carry out a tax-free complete liquidation under sec-
tion 337 of the Code.33 Had the gain from the insurance proceeds been
realized after the liquidation plan's adoption, section 337 would have pre-
cluded taxation of the gain.8 ' The Internal Revenue Service, however,
successfully contended that the gain accrued at the time of the fire.3 5 The
taxpayer correctly pointed out that one upshot of a pro-government re-
sult would be that the well-counseled taxpayer would elect to use section
1033(a)(3),," a complex rule under which insurance proceeds gains can be
23. 331 U.S. 694 (1947).
24. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 24(b), 53 Stat. 16 (now I.R.C. § 267(a)(1)).
25. 331 U.S. at 695.
26. Id.
27. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 118, 53 Stat. 53 (now I.R.C. § 1091(a)) (prohibiting
deduction of losses resulting from the sale of stock when the taxpayer repurchases substan-
tially the same stock within a 30-day period).
28. See 331 U.S. at 697-703.
29. Id. at 702.
30. 417 U.S. 673 (1974).
31. Id. at 675.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 676.
34. See I.R.C. § 337(a).
35. 417 U.S. at 678.
36. I.R.C. § 1033(a)(3).
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deferred through investments in replacement property followed by a sec-
tion 337 liquidation.3 7 The Court, however, was not impressed. With great
dignity, the Court suggested that it dealt with actualities, asserting that
"[t]ax consequences follow what has taken place, not what might have
taken place."38 The Court declined to subvert directly the trap for the
unwary doctrine and did not refer to it in so many words. In short, the
trap for the unwary concept is a trap for the unwary. It is a respected
makeweight that can win a close case, but standing alone it is clearly
unreliable.
C. Symmetry
It appears rational to presume that if a transaction in a business con-
text creates income to one person, it should create a business deduction
to another. The mind seeks order and balance. Unfortunately, the courts
do not. While symmetry is frequently mentioned as a desirable result, the
concept does not constitute the sole basis for decisions, although it often
triggers dissents and underlies complex decisions.
The strongest positive statements of a judicial preference for symme-
try are found in the narrowest subject areas, specifically those that raise
accounting questions.39 For example, in Commissioner v. Standard Life &
Accident Insurance Co.' 0 the Supreme Court said, "Although we do not
accept the notion that there must be perfect symmetry in the tax laws,
there should be a measure of consistency in the accounting treatment of
an item affecting interrelated elements .... ,,41 On a deeper level, how-
ever, symmetry is a handmaiden of equity and good sense;42 and as such,
37. 417 U.S. at 689-90.
38. Id. at 690 (citing Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co., 417
U.S. 134 (1974)). If the Supreme Court means what it says, the rule in J. Simpson Dean, 35
T.C. 1083 (1961), will collapse. In Dean the Tax Court treated interest-free loans from a
close corporation as not creating income to the borrower because the borrower could have
deducted an amount equal to such imputed income as interest paid. Id. at 1090. See gener-
ally O'Hare, The Taxation of Interest-Free Loans, 27 VAM. L. REv. 1085 (1974).
39. Negative statements regarding the role of symmetry may also be found. For exam-
ple, in Busse v. Commissioner, 479 F.2d 1147 (7th Cir. 1973), protests of dissimilar treat-
ment of taxpayers through a literal application of the Code were rejected with the following
language:
However much the statute, in operation, may offend the Commissioner's sense of
symmetry and propriety, we cannot say that the results it causes are either
absurd or unintended by Congress. Courts have no power (ust as the Commis-
sioner has no power in his capacity as an administrative official) "to rewrite leg-
islative enactments to give effect to" their "ideas of policy and fitness or the
desirability of symmetry in statutes."
Id. at 1152 (quoting United States v. Shirah, 253 F.2d 798, 800 (4th Cir. 1958)).
40. 433 U.S. 148 (1978).
41. Id. at 160.
42. When accounting principles conflict with the interests of the Treasury, however,
the Supreme Court's preference for symmetry in the accounting field dissolves entirely and
is replaced with "logic" that compels cash-method taxpayers to include all income actually
or constructively received while denying them deductions for expenses constructively paid
and forcing them to capitalize prepaid expenses. (This "logic," in other words, puts them on
[Vol. 17
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it may play a significant role in the formulation of powerful judicial con-
structions of the Code.
For example, the Court in Crane v. Commissioner"3 held that the
term "property" for the purpose *of section 1001 (defining gains and
losses)"4 includes the amount of mortgage debt encumbering the trans-
ferred property.45 The facts involved a taxpayer who inherited land sub-
ject to a mortgage that equaled the value of the land, but she did not
assume the mortgage.46 After sale of the land, she asserted that the value
of the "property" she acquired from the decedent equaled only her "eq-
uity" in the land4 7-the "equity" was said to equal the excess of the value
of the land over the amount of the mortgage. 8 Using such a theory, the
taxpayer's equity in the land would have been zero on the date she ac-
quired the land;49 and when she sold the land, the amount realized on the
sale would have been the net amount of cash received.50 The Supreme
Court disagreed, however, saying that the taxpayer's basis for determin-
ing gain or loss was the value of the land undiminished by the value of
the accrual method.) The same Supreme Court taxes accrual-method taxpayers on receipts
of cash or property taken under "claim of right" (evidently limited to earnings), which has
the effect of putting them on the cash method as to such amounts, and rejects their efforts
to apply "matching" concepts of financial accounting (in order to avoid distortions of in-
come from an accountant's viewpoint) in their efforts to establish deferral of prepayments
or reserves for future expenses, unless those deferrals and reserves are the work of perfec-
tion. Absent perfection of matching, a worse standard imposed by the Commissioner will
prevail as a result of the Supreme Court's finding that a taxpayer's less-than-perfect (but
clearly reasonable) method is "purely artificial." The effect of the contrived finding is that
the Service's authority to impose an accounting-method adjustment under section 446(b) is
upheld as no abuse of discretion. For a discussion of this confusion, see J. CHOMMm, FED-
ERAL INco m TAXATiON §§ 82-83 (2d ed. 1973).
43. 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
44. Section 1001(a) defines "gain" and "loss":
The gain from the sale or other disposition of property shall be the excess of the
amount realized therefrom over the adjusted basis provided in section 1011 for
*determining gain, and the loss shall be the excess of the adjusted basis provided
in such section for determining loss over the amount realized.
I.R.C. § 1001(a). Section 1001(b) defines "amount realized":
The amount realized from the sale or other disposition of property shall be the
sum of any money received plus the fair market value of the property (other
than money) received. In determining the amount realized-
(1) there shall not be taken into account any amount received as re-
imbursement for real property taxes which are treated under section
164(d) as imposed on the purchaser, and (2) there shall be taken into
account amounts representing real property taxes which are treated
under section 164(d) as imposed on the taxpayer if such taxes are to be
paid. by the purchaser.
I.R.C. § 1001(b).
45. 331 U.S. at 11.
46. Id. at 3-4.
47. Id. at 3.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 4.
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the mortgage.5 1 Further, the Court held that the amount realized upon
sale of the land was the amount of cash received plus the amount of the
mortgage.5 2 The Court's holding is perfectly symmetrical and balanced:
the liabilities are included in the amount realized, but they are also in-
cluded in the taxpayer's basis (thus reducing the amount of realized gain
upon sale).53
In the landmark case of Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commis-
sioner,5' the Court concluded that profits and losses from future transac-
tions designed to "hedge" against increases in corn prices were so bound
up with the daily activities of a grain products manufacturing corporation
that they could not qualify for capital gains treatment.5 5 While the Court
relied on several theories for reaching its result, one can fairly argue that
the foundation for the decision was fundamental discomfort with the
asymmetry of earning capital gains in transactions intimately bound up
with a taxpayer's day-to-day manufacturing activities.
Naturally, given the need for makeweights and comfortable syllo-
gisms, the Court has made other positive statements about symmetry.
Thus, in United States v. Olympic Radio & Television, Inc.56 Justice
Douglas used notions of symmetry to justify the Court's decision to deny
an accrual-method taxpayer the right to deduct current payment of ex-
cess-profits taxes accrued in a prior year for purposes of determining the
taxpayer's net operating loss for the year.57 While admitting that the re-
sult might discriminate against accrual-method taxpayers, the Court re-
fused to give the words "paid" or "accrued" a different meaning for net
operating loss purposes than for other purposes in the same chapter of
the Code:
We can only take the Code as we find it and give it as great an internal
symmetry and consistency as its words permit. We would not be faith-
ful to the statutory scheme, as revealed by the words employed, if we
gave "paid or accrued" a different meaning for the purposes of
§ 122(d)(6) than it has in the other parts of the same chapter.5 8
In Commissioner v. Lester the Supreme Court cited Olympic as a jus-
tification for including in a husband's income all money paid to the di-
vorced wife except to the extent that the money was unequivocally alloca-
51. Id. at 11.
52. Id. at 13.
53. Brountas v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 491, 574 (1979).
54. 350 U.S. 46 (1955). Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6 (1952), requiring the
character of losses or deductions related to prior transactions to be correlated with the prior
transaction's character (capital versus ordinary), represents another creative landmark deci-
sion that can be, but was not, rationalized as an application of the principle of symmetry to
the tax laws.
55. 350 U.S. at 50.
56. 349 U.S. 232 (1955).
57. Id. at 236.
58. Id.
59. 366 U.S. 299 (1961).
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ble to child support. 0 The Court proclaimed that "as we have frequently
stated, the Code must be given 'as great an internal symmetry and consis-
tency as its words permit.'-
61
An assertion that the Supreme Court has frequently said it will seek
maximum internal consistency in the Code is a mere invention.2 Contra-
dictory statements are common,u and the fact is that the Supreme Court
sometimes manufactures asymmetry." Perhaps its most asymmetrical
product is the treatment of gifts. Gifts are not included in the recipient's
income, 5 and whether a transfer is a gift depends on the transferor's in-
tent.66 The standard of intent called for to qualify a transfer as a gift
requires "detached and disinterested generosity" 67 resulting from "affec-
tion, respect, admiration, charity or like impulses" 8-in other words,
love. Clearly, the standard is narrow. On the other hand, a business ex-
pense is deductible only if it is, among other things, "necessary"69 in the
sense of being "appropriate and helpful"7 -- in other words, good for busi-
ness. One must strain to imagine a transfer that is simultaneously loving
and good for business, yet there are situations in which the two concepts
coincide. For example, old Bob, the night watchman, tearfully receives his
gold watch, given by his adoring employer with fitting ceremony after
years of loyal service. Employee morale rises, at least according to the
company's accountant, and the cost of the watch is deducted. Old Bob
excludes the watch from income. The result is perfect asymmetry-a non-
taxable receipt for old Bob, and a deduction with the implicit approval of
the Supreme Court. The Internal Revenue Service's effort to fashion a
test barring a gift result to the recipient if the transfer is made for busi-
ness reasons was explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court in Commis-
sioner v. Duberstein.71 The Treasury considers itself robbed, but analyti-
cally it is not since deductions and gifts are tested by different standards.
If love and good business can co-exist in a single transaction, those differ-
60. Id. at 304.
61. Id.
62. See, e.g., Rudolph v. United States, 370 U.S. 269 (1962); Commissioner v. Duber-
stein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960); United States v. Shaefer Brewing Co., 356 U.S. 227 (1958).
63. For example, in Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569 (1966), the Court held that the
word "primarily" as used in I.R.C. § 1221(1), which deals with "property held by the tax-
payer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business," means
"of first importance." 383 U.S. at 572. The First Circuit Court of Appeals in International
Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 491 F.2d 157, 160 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 834
(1974), and the Court of Claims in Continental Can Co. v. United States, 422 F.2d 405, 410-
11 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 819 (1970), concluded that the word "primarily" as used
in I.R.C. § 123(b)(1)(B) meant "acceptable and predictable" as part of the taxpayer's
business.
64. See note 42 supra.
65. I.R.C. § 102(a).
66. Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1960).
67. Commissioner v. LoBue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956).
68. Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711, 714 (1952).
69. I.R.C. § 162(a).
70. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933).
71. 363 U.S. 278, 284 (1960).
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ent standards will on occasion dictate fiscally unbalanced results.72
The topic of symmetry and asymmetry in the Code is practically lim-
itless. Perhaps the most truthful conclusion about symmetry as an inter-
pretative device is found in Burck v. United States:73 "The tax laws are
such a hodgepodge of exceptions, qualifications, special interests and
sometimes logically inconsistent treatment that they cannot be treated as
symmetrical exigeses [sic]." 4
D. Respect for Legislated Conditions
The doctrine of respect for legislated conditions can be roughly
stated as follows: The courts will not interpret the tax laws so as to grant
tax benefits on conditions less stringent than those imposed by the Con-
gress in granting similar tax benefits.75 The courts will, in other words,
respect the conditions associated with tax relief legislation. The concept
might be viewed as an extension of the maxim expressio unius est ex-
clusio alterius76 to tax legislation, although the courts that have applied
the "rule" have stopped short of saying so and instead have relied on a
doubtful presumption that the Congress meant to limit strictly its tai
relief provisions.
The doctrine of respect for legislated conditions is well-illustrated by
Harrison Property Management Co. v. United States,7 7 a decision involv-
ing dummy corporations. In Harrison the government successfully as-
serted that to disregard the corporation for federal income tax purposes,
while respecting it for state law purposes, would be tantamount to grant-
ing its shareholders the benefits of Subchapter S corporate status (in
other words, a corporation treated in many respects as a conduit) without
the associated limitations.7 8 The taxpayers had argued that tax law
clearly acknowledges that agents are not taxable on funds they receive for
the benefit of their principals.7 9
72. I.R.C. § 274(b) alleviates this problem by limiting annual business gift deductions
to particular dollar amounts per donee per year. The right to claim a business gift deduction
may be doubtful in any case. For the position that when there are mixed business and per-
sonal motives for an expenditure, the business purpose must be paramount, see Kilbourn,
Deductible Expenses: Transactions Entered into for a Profit; Income-Producing Property,
21 N.Y.U. TAX INsT. 193 (1962). If this is true, Duberstein's requirement that the dominant
motive for a gift be "love" leads to the conclusion that such gifts are not deductible.
73. 533 F.2d 768 (2d Cir. 1975).
74. Id. at 772 n.7.
75. The phrase "respect for legislated conditions" is an invention of the author.
76. "Expressio unius est exclusio alterius" means the expression of one thing is the
exclusion of another. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 692 (4th ed. 1968).
77. 475 F.2d 623 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
78. Id. at 629-30.
79. Id. The court expressed its concerns in the following language:
It appears highly probable that Harrison Property Management Company,
though a small business corporation, could not qualify for Subchapter S benefits
because more than 20 percent of its receipts in the taxable years was "passive
investment income" from rents-a specific exception contained in Section
1372(e)(5). This limitation is still an integral part of the Congressional design for
[Vol. 17
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Another example of judicial respect for legislated conditions is War-
ren Jones Co. v. Commissioner," a case involving the timing of deferred
payments on the sale of apartment buildings. The taxpayer attempted to
escape the realization provision of section 1001(b) and to defer his gain
on the sale until he recovered his basis. He asserted that, aside from cash,
the only items taxable as "amounts realized" on sale or exchange are the
highly liquid debt instruments set forth in the section 453(b)(3) limita-
tion on the use of the installment-sales election." The Ninth Circuit held,
however, that such a narrow interpretation would exclude many types of
property from immediate realization, thereby defeating the taxpayer's
motivation for using the installment-sales election. According to the
court, Congress did not intend that the installment-sales provision be
used so infrequently."2 It seems fair to say that the court refused to inter-
pret the broadly applicable words "amount realized" in a fashion that
would subvert the usage of section 453 by granting taxpayers similar tax
deferral benefits without meeting the terms of section 453.
This interpretative technique seriously falters when it confronts
supportable taxpayer arguments that the statutory provision is a non-ex-
clusive "safe haven," which, when satisfied, assures the taxpayer of his
desired result. The statute, according to the taxpayer, merely represents
one of many means to achieve a particular result. An arguable conflict
between the decision in Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. 83 and section
334(b)(2) of the I.R.C. presents the leading example. The Kimbell-Dia-
lifting the tax from the corporation-an existing legislative restriction which
would be thwarted if non-eligible companies could attain the same result by the
simple procedure of a surfacial "principle"-"agent" agreement which is not in
essence divorced from the owner-corporation relationship.
Id.
80. 524 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1975).
81. Id. at 789, 793.
82. The court expressed its concern in much the same way the Court of Claims did in
Harrison:
Congress added section 453(b)(3) to the Code for the purpose of excluding from
the installment basis those taxpayers who sell property and receive more than 30
percent of the selling price in the form of highly liquid instruments of debt.
Congress concluded that such taxpayers, like taxpayers receiving cash, would not
suffer the hardships that the installment basis was designed to alleviate ....
We find no indication that Congress intended that section 453(b)(3) should be
given a broader application. If we were to adopt the taxpayer's argument, we
would substantially nullify section 453 with respect to cash basis taxpayers re-
ceiving deferred payment obligations other than those described in section
453(b)(3). Such taxpayers, not required to include the fair market value of their
obligations in determining the amount realized under section 1001(b), would
rarely, if ever, elect to report on the installment basis. In the light of the other
legislative history of section 453, hitherto discussed, it is clear to us that Con-
gress, in 1969, did not contemplate, or intend, such a result.
Id. at 793 (citations omitted).
83. 14 T.C. 74 (1950), aff'd, 187 F.2d 718 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 827 (1951).
See generally Henderson, Voting Stock in a Two-Step Acquisition: The Kimbell-Diamond
Reorganization, 25 TAx L. REv. 375 (1970); Levin & Bowen, Taxable and Tax-Free Two-
Step Acquisitions and Minority Squeeze-Outs, 33 TAx L. Rav. 425 (1978).
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mond decison held, on the principle of substance over form, that a corpo-
ration that acquired the stock of a target company and promptly liqui-
dated that company pursuant to an asset-acquisition plan was entitled to
take a basis in the former subsidiary's assets equal to the cost of such
stock.8' The 1954 Code later added section 334(b)(2), which assures a
stock-price basis if various technical requirements are met.8
Later decisions tested the question of whether transactions meeting
the requirements of Kimbell-Diamond but not section 334(b)(2) would
qualify for the special basis rule. The first forum to confront clearly the
question was the Court of Claims in American Potash & Chemical Corp.
v. United States.86 The particular issue presented was whether a taxpayer
with the requisite intent to liquidate a target company that engaged in a
transaction within the Kimbell-Diamond rule but outside section
334(b)(2)87 was entitled to a cost-of-stock basis in the target company's
assets.88 The court held that Kimbell-Diamond was not pre-empted,89
reasoning that: (1) the Congress' failure to modify expressly the Kimbell-
Diamond rule was significant;90 (2) section 334(b)(2) was designed to
create a safe haven within which the knotty matter of taxpayer's intent
could be avoided;9 1 and (3) Congress intended to prevent the cost-basis
rule from being elective.92 All three reasons were based on the court's in-
terpretation of the intent of Congress.
93
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals came to an opposite result in
Broadview Lumber v. United States." The court read the same foggy leg-
islative history,95 especially a Senate report,96 as limiting the benefits of
the Kimbell-Diamond rule to those circumstances set forth in section
334(b)(2).97 Having divined the legislative purpose, it said that the Amer-
ican Potash notion that section 334(b)(2) is a mere safe haven "would
render Congress' action meaningless."98 That is true only if section
334(b)(2) was not meant to be a safe haven.
Who is to blame for this mess? Clearly, the Congress is. These cases
represent an unjustifiable waste of money and legal talent. A little
84. 14 T.C. at 80-81.
85. I.R.C. § 334(b)(2).
86. 399 F.2d 194 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
87. The taxpayer corporation failed to meet the regulatory requirement that control of
the target company be obtained within any 12-month period. Id. at 200.
88. Id. at 206.
89. Id. at 207-08.
90. Id. at 207.
91. Id. at 207-08.
92. Id. at 208.
93. See id. at 208-09.
94. 561 F.2d 698 (7th Cir. 1977); see Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 288 F.
Supp. 429 (D. Idaho 1968), afl'd per curiam, 429 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1970).
95. See 561 F.2d at 711-13.
96. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1954] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4621.




thought and a few words in the committee reports would have avoided
costly litigation and uncertainty for both the government and the tax-
payers. The uncertainty continues.99
To summarize, the "respect for legislated conditions" concept is an-
other arrow in the litigant's quiver. It is superficially appealing and cer-
tainly confusing, but it should be applied only if it is really a shorthand
way of saying that Congress intended the related, potentially subverted
Code section to be the exclusive way of attaining tax grace. 100
E. Placing the Burden on the Draftsmen
It is an established maxim of common law that ambiguities in a con-
tract should be construed against the draftsman. Presumably, penumbral
emanations from the fourth 01 and fifth 02 amendments should impose the
same rule in resolving the hideous complexities of the Internal Revenue
Code. Indeed, Sutherland08 agrees that this is the rule: "[I]t is a settled
rule that tax laws are to be strictly construed against the state and in
favor of the taxpayer. Where there is reasonable doubt as to the meaning
of a revenue statute, the doubt is resolved in favor of those being
taxed."11°4 Sutherland goes on to quote 05 forceful language from Gould v.
99. The Tax Court has held that section 334(b)(2) preempts Kimbell-Diamond. Inter-
national State Bank v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 173 (1978). The Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals agrees with the Tax Court. See Chrome Plate, Inc. v. District Director of Internal
Revenue (In re Chrome Plate, Inc.), 614 F.2d 990 (5th Cir. 1980).
100. Sometimes the right result flows from ignoring the concept. In Joseph P. Pike, 44
T.C. 787 (1965), the Tax Court ruled that the benefit of section 1341, which provides relief
to taxpayers required to return income, was not available to a taxpayer who failed to show
that he did not legally own income that he was required to return after receipt. Id. at 800.
Although the court in Pike found that the taxpayer had not shown that the original pay-
ment was not legally his, it allowed the taxpayer to take a trade or business deduction under
section 162, id. at 801, even though to do so arguably rendered the deduction provision of
section 1341 redundant and overlooked the possibility that Congress intended section 1341
to be exclusive.
101. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
102. No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in
time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same of-
fence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.
Id. amend. V.
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Gould'08 which would make the taxpayer's heart glow. In Gould the Su-
preme Court held that tax laws should be construed against the govern-
ment. Unfortunately for taxpayers, further analysis reveals deep cracks in
the foundation of Sutherland's authority. Specifically, the Supreme Court
has interpreted provisions allowing deductions and capital gains so nar-
rowly (while at the same time interpreting its definition of gross income
so expansively) that the fine language of Gould has been largely crushed
under the wheel of justice.
Courts have been particularly parsimonious in finding deductions
from income. The popular expression that "deductions are a matter of
legislative grace" carries with it the doubtful implication that taxes
should be levied on gross incomes rather than net incomes. This notion
entered the tax lexicon in 1934 in New Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering'01
and has been a glibly applied government weapon ever since.
Dean Griswold has provided thoughtful commentary on this issue. 08
He points out that the Supreme Court's position in Gould was inevitably
rejected because it operated as a mind-deadening substitute for the
court's proper function of finding the intent of Congress and interpreting
the statute in light of that intention."0 9 In his view," 0 Gould really per-
ished at the hand of Mr. Justice Stone in White v. United States.'"
Stone said:
We are not impressed by the argument that, as the question here de-
cided is doubtful, all doubts should be resolved in favor of the taxpayer.
It is the function and duty of courts to resolve doubts. We know of no
reason why that function should be abdicated in a tax case more than
in any other where the rights of suitors turn on the construction of a
statute and it is our duty to decide what that construction fairly should
be.112
Griswold finds the New Colonial Ice rule equally unsound for the same
reason."8
As to capital gains, Gould has no force. Courts take a stingy view of
the capital gains provisions because they perceive the favorable taxation
of long-term capital gains as an exception to the general rule of taxing
gains fully. The Supreme Court's current position on this issue is clearly
106. 245 U.S. 151 (1915).
107. 292 U.S. 435 (1934). "Whether and to what extent deductions shall be allowed
depends upon legislative grace; and only as there is clear provision therefor can any particu-
lar deduction be allowed." Id. at 440; accord, Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27 (1958);
Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590 (1943); Helvering v. Inter-Mountain
Life Ins. Co., 294 U.S. 686 (1935).
108. Griswold, An Argument Against the Doctrine that Deductions Should be Nar-
rowly Construed as a Matter of Legislative Grace, 56 HAv. L. REv. 1142 (1943).
109. Id. at 1142-43.
110. Id. at 1143.
111. 305 U.S. 281 (1938).
112. Id. at 292.
113. Griswold, An Argument Against the Doctrine that Deductions Should be Nar-
rowly Construed as a Matter of Legislative Grace, 56 HARv. L. REV. 1142, 1144-45 (1943).
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that if it is ambiguous whether something is a capital asset, the presump-
tion is against the taxpayer.11
The inversion of Gould is virtually complete with the Supreme
Court's comprehensive definition of "gross income." It seems fair to say
that Congress intends a broad definition of income, but its authority
turns on the scope of the term "income" as used in the sixteenth amend-
ment.125 In Eisner v. Macomber"6 the Court held that unless labor or
capital (or both) was the source of the receipt, the disputed gain was not
subject to taxation.1 1 7 Using this test, the Court excluded from taxation a
stock dividend on the ground that it represented merely a balance-sheet
transfer."" The Court's rather confined definition was undone in Com-
missioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 119 in which the Court held taxable a
treble-damages award under the antitrust laws.2 0 The Court's new test
for defining "income," under what is now section 61,121 focuses on "unde-
114. In Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner the Court said:
Since this section is an exception from the normal tax requirements of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code, the definition of a capital asset must be narrowly applied and
its exclusions interpreted broadly. This is necessary to effectuate the basic con-
gressional purpose. This Court has always construed narrowly the term "capital
assets" in [section 1221].
350 U.S. 46, 52 (1955) (citing Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28, 31 (1941), and Kieselbach
v. Commissioner, 317 U.S. 399, 403 (1943)).
115. The sixteenth amendment states that "[tihe Congress shall have power to lay and
collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the
several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration." U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
116. 252 U.S. 189 (1920). For an extensive discussion of Eisner, see Mullock, Current
Concepts of Taxable Income, 25 OHIo ST. L.J. 151 (1964).
117. 252 U.S. at 207.
118. Id. at 219.
119. 348 U.S. 426 (1955). For a further analysis of Glenshaw Glass, see Wright, The
Effect of the Source of Realized Benefits upon the Supreme Court's Concept of Taxable
Receipts, 8 STAN. L. REv. 164 (1956).
120. 348 U.S. at 432-33.
121. Section 61(a) lists certain items included in gross income:
(a) General definition. Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross in-
come means all income from whatever source derived, including (but not limited
to) the following items:
(1) Compensation for services, including fees, commissions, and similar
items;
(2) Gross income derived from business;





(8) Alimony and separate maintenance payments;
(9) Annuities;
(10) Income from life insurance and endowment contracts;
(11) Pensions;
(12) Income from discharge of indebtedness;
(13) Distributive share of partnership gross income;
(14) Income in respect of a decedent; and
(15) Income from an interest in an estate or trust.
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niable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers
have complete dominion.' 22 The word "source" as a limitation left the
lexicon; increases in wealth entered. The new standards are much broader
than the old. Accordingly, the catch-all provision of section 61 is truly
sweeping; any transaction that increases a taxpayer's net worth invites a
finding of income under the "accession to wealth" standard.
In short, not only is the rule that ambiguities in the taxing statute
should be resolved against the government defunct, but the practical bur-
den is often on the taxpayer. All "accessions to wealth" are income, de-
ductions and exemptions are matters of "legislative grace," and taxpayers
have to scramble to show that their transaction resulted in capital gains
rather than ordinary income.
123
Does this mean the taxpayer has no real weapons? By now, the
reader should be intuitively confident that the answer is in the negative.
While statements that the Constitution authorizes the taxation of gross
income are fairly commonplace, so are contradictory statements.124 For
example, although the results were adverse to the crafty taxpayer in
Goldstein v. Commissioner,25 the Second Circuit's language seems partic-
ularly helpful to taxpayers caught in the web of New Colonial Ice:
Although it is by no means certain that Congress constitutionally could
tax gross income, . .. it is frequently stated that deductions from
"gross income" are a matter of "legislative grace.". . . There is at least
this much truth in this oft-repeated maxim: a close question whether a
particular Code provision authorizes the deduction of a certain item is
best resolved by reference to the underlying Congressional purpose of
the deduction provision in question. 26
Clearly, Goldstein at least puts the focus back where it belongs-on Con-
gressional purpose. A reference to Goldstein and a few selected tax cases
and authorities may put a reasonable judge back on his proper course,
but the presumption against taxation has clearly dissolved.
F. A Regulation's Presumptive Correctness
It is a bromide that interpretative regulations issued by the Treasury
enjoy a presumption of correctness. 27 While one can make a few general
statements about the different degrees of authority properly accorded dif-
ferent types of regulations, the judicial pronouncements are in fact won-
drously inconsistent. Regulations fall into two distinct classes: those
I.R.C. § 61(a).
122. 348 U.S. at 431.
123. See R. MAGILL, TAXABLE INcomE 367-73 (rev. ed. 1945).
124. Compare Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966) (suggesting a judicial dis-
taste for taxing gross income), with James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961) (stating
that Congress can tax all gains except those specifically exempted as a matter of legislative
grace).
125. 364 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967).
126. 364 F.2d at 740-41 (citations omitted).
127. See J. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION 13 (2d ed. 1973).
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which are "interpretative" and those which are "legislative. '128 Interpre-
tative regulations are issued pursuant to the general rule-making power
granted to the Secretary of the Treasury under Code section 7805(a).12'
Legislative regulations are issued pursuant to some specific Code sec-
tionIs1 such as Code section 1502, which authorizes the Secretary to pro-
mulgate "such regulations as he may deem necessary" to determine the
tax liability of affiliated corporations on a consolidated federal income tax
return.1 31 It is generally said that legislative regulations will not be over-
turned unless they exceed the scope of the statute, contradict the statute,
or are unreasonable.232 Because they are deemed to carry the force of
law,13 3 they bind the Treasury and taxpayers.134 They have great
weight. 35
128. See generally Rogovin, The Four R's: Regulations, Rulings, Reliance and Retro-
activity-A View From Within, 43 TAXEs 756 (1965); Williams, Preparation and Promulga-
tion of Treasury Department Regulations Under Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 1956 U.S.
CAL. TAX INsT. 733. The third class, procedural regulations, are not considered here.
129. Except where such authority is expressly given by this title to any person
other than an officer or employee of the Treasury Department, the Secretary
shall prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of this title,
including all rules and regulations as may be necessary by reason of any altera-
tion of law in relation to internal revenue.
I.R.C. § 7805(a).
130. See J. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 13 (2d ed. 1973).
131. I.R.C. § 1502.
132. Rogovin, The Four R's: Regulations, Rulings, Reliance and Retroactivity-A
View From Within, 43 TAXEs 756, 759 (1965).
133. "Treasury regulations carry a presumption of correctness and seldom are invali-
dated by the courts. Also, legislative regulations are regarded as having the status of law,
and interpretive regulations, as well as any consistent prior administrative and judicial in-
terpretation, may acquire the status of law under the reenactment doctrine." J. CHOMMIE,
FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION 13 (2d ed. 1973).
134. The Supreme Court emphasizes the great judicial deference to be given to legisla-
tive regulations:
Where the act uses ambiguous terms, or is of doubtful construction, a clarifying
regulation or one indicating the method of its application to specific cases not
only is permissible but is to be given great weight by the courts. And the same
principle governs where the statute merely expresses a general rule and invests
the Secretary of the Treasury with authority to promulgate regulations appropri-
ate to its enforcement.
Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441, 446-47 (1936) (dicta).
135. The Supreme Court says that "[i]t is the settled rule that the practical interpre-
tation of an ambiguous or doubtful statute that has been acted upon by officials charged
with its administration will not be disturbed except for weighty reasons." Brewster v. Gage,
280 U.S. 327, 336 (1930). One circuit court of appeals has adopted a strict standard to be
used in determining the validity of a legislative regulation, saying that "[w]hen Congress has
used a general term and has empowered an administrator to define it, the courts must re-
spect his construction if this is within the range of reason." Commissioner v. Pepsi-Cola
Niagara Bottling Corp., 399 F.2d 390, 393 (2d Cir. 1968); accord, Farrell-Birmingham Co. v.
United States, 121 F. Supp. 636 (Ct. Cl.), modified, 125 F. Supp. 297 (1954). The United
States Supreme Court has also stated, "Those who insist that.., a regulation is invalid
must make its invalidity so manifest that the court has no choice except to hold that the
Secretary has exceeded his authority and employed means that are not at all appropriate to
the end specified in the act of Congress." Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459, 470 (1900);
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The weight accorded to interpretative regulations remains unclear. 3 6
The words of section 7805 do not invest such regulations with the force of
law; however, the application of canons of statutory construction can in-
vest them with substantially more authority than mere interpretations by
a partisan tax collector. Although the most common shibboleth in this
area is that interpretative regulations are presumptively correct, Ran-
dolph Paul's research reveals so extensive a range of judicial pronounce-
ments that all that seems missing is a statement that Treasury regula-
tions are presumptively wrong.
18 7
When an interpretative regulation is found to have no weight (in
other words, is wrong), it is denounced as either inconsistent with the
statute or unreasonable. 38 What constitutes "unreasonableness" is im-
accord, Noble Motor Co. v. United States, 231 F. Supp. 702, 708 (D. Md. 1964). And in
order to invalidate legislative regulations, one must sustain a burden of "greater weight"
than when attempting to invalidate interpretative regulations. Goldman v. Commissioner,
497 F.2d 382, 383 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1974).
136. It has been stated, however, that in detbrmining the validity of such regulations,
the court determines whether the regulation is (1) within the granted power of the statute,
(2) issued pursuant to proper procedure, and (3) reasonable. Kramertown Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 488 F.2d 728, 730 (5th Cir. 1974); see 1 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 5.03, at 299
(1958).
137. See Paul, Use and Abuse of Tax Regulations in Statutory Construction, 49 YALE
LJ. 660, 662-63 (1940). In footnotes 13 and 14, Paul comments:
13. The expressions of the courts in speaking of the deference due to regu-
lations vary all the way from statements that a "regulation rises to no higher
dignity than an expression of opinion". . . to statements that they are entitled
to "great weight".., or are not to be overruled "except for weighty reasons"
... or even that they have almost the force and effect of law .... These de-
grees of verbal rhetoric, however, merely clutter up the interpretative problem,
and could be abolished from the judicial lexicon with little loss; it is most un-
likely that an actual judgment in many cases would have been different if the
court had started out with exactly the opposite formula ...
14. Sometimes, in fact, a ruling contrary to the Court's conclusion is not
even accorded the honor of mention. . . . [In one case] Justice Holmes con-
tented himself with the terse statement that there was no reason why the regula-
tions regarding cancelled bonds "should not be accepted as a correct statement
of law."
Id. at 662-63 nn.13 & 14 (citations omitted).
138. Several general rules can be stated concerning the effect and validity of Treasury
Regulations:
[T]he regulations of an administrative agency charged with the duty to carry out
a congressional mandate are entitled to great weight. Treasury regulations are
invalid, however, if they are out of harmony with the intent of the statute, or
they contradict the express terms of the statute. To be valid, they must be con-
sistent with the statute and be reasonable. . . . Often, in speaking of the inter-
pretive regulation-making power of the Treasury, as opposed to the legislative
rule-making power of the Treasury, courts speak of the sole purpose of an inter-
pretive regulation as being to reconcile ambiguities in the statute with reasoned
interpretation. If the statute is unambiguous on its face, there is no room for
Treasury interpretation. . . . All courts recognize the principle, however, that
the Treasury has no power to supply an omission or create an exception not
already in the statute.
Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. United States, 589 F.2d 1040, 1045 (Ct. Cl. 1978) (citations
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possible to analyze meaningfully, and the question of inconsistency is too
basic to cover. The interesting questions involve matters of degree." 9
One factor that clearly counts is the length of time that a disputed
regulation has been outstanding. Old regulations are, all things being
equal, better than young regulations. This rule is frequently announced
and rests on sound concepts of tax administration.' 40 With the passage of
time, one can presume that more people have relied on the interpretation;
and a reversal would accordingly engender greater inconvenience and con-
fusion.' Following the issuance of a regulation, taxpayers have the op-
portunity to challenge the regulation judicially. Alternatively, it may be
obvious to taxpayers, the Treasury, or both that the regulation is ill-con-
ceived and that it should be reformulated. But once the period to mea-
sure and challenge the regulation has passed, the public interest in legal
stability dictates enhancement of the regulation's value.
Another major but sometimes paradoxical factor involves contempo-
raneousness with the statute.'" In other words, the shorter the time span
between issuance of the statute and promulgation of the regulation, the
greater the weight given to the regulation. This long-favored 43 preference
is premised on the notion that the persons involved in drafting regula-
tions are much more likely to do a good job when the legislative history of
the statute is fresh in their minds.14 4 In fact, the contemporaneous drafts-
man may be more alert to opportunities for stacking the regulation in the
Treasury's favor; but because Treasury personnel take an active role in
formulating statutes and committee reports, the preference for contempo-
omitted).
139. As to the reasonableness of a regulation, the Supreme Court has listed recently
several factors to be examined:
[W]e look to see whether the regulation harmonizes with the plain language of
the statute, its origin, and its purpose. A regulation may have particular force if
it is a substantially contemporaneous construction of the statute by those pre-
sumed to have been aware of congressional intent. If the regulation dates from a
later period, the manner in which it evolved merits inquiry. Other relevant con-
siderations are the length of time the regulation has been in effect, the reliance
placed on it, the consistency of the Commissioner's interpretation, and the de-
gree of scrutiny Congress has devoted to the regulation during subsequent re-
enactments of the statute.
National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979).
140. See note 139 supra.
141. See Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem, 54 HARV. L. REV. 398,
409-11 (1941).
142. National Muffler Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979).
143. Edwards' Lessee v. Darby, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 206 (1827). "In the construction of
a doubtful and ambiguous law, the contemporaneous construction of those who were called
upon to act under the law, and were appointed to carry its provisions into effect, is entitled
to very great respect." Id. at 210.
144. See Commissioner v. South Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496 (1947) (treasury regu-
lations are contemporaneous constructions of the revenue statutes by those charged with the
administration of these statutes and should not be invalidated except for overwhelming rea-
sons); Fawcus Mach. Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 375 (1931) (administrative regulations
contemporaneously construing a statute, which are not unreasonable or inconsistent with
the statute, will not be overruled except for weighty reasons).
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raneous statutes has a factual foundation.1 5 The crucial point is that the
proper way to approach regulations is not to invent presumptions with so
little support in logic that the courts will inevitably distort them, but
rather to view the subject of the inquiry as being the orderly development
of tax administration.
II. SUGGESTED REFORMS
The foregoing litany certainly does not exhaust the list of interpreta-
tive rules. Others include the power of the courts to plug loopholes in the
law,146 horizontal 147 and vertical equity,148 and the role of equity in con-
struing a statute. Nonetheless, the frailty of the interpretative techniques
already discussed and the seeming opportunism with which the courts ap-
ply them are causes for concern. There are occasional moments of judiciAl
candor on this subject. Learned Hand's comment on his reaction to a
complex tax decision is surely explicit:
In my own case the words of such an act as the Income Tax, for exam-
145. Williams, Preparation and Promulgation of Treasury Department Regulations
Under Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 1956 U.S. CAL. TAX INsT. 733, 741. The matter of the
proper role of tax regulations, as well as thorny questions of retroactivity and an appeal for
expelling the reenactment doctrine, are thoughtfully and clearly presented by Dean Gris-
wold. See Griswold, A Summary of the Regulations Problem, 54 HARv. L. REV. 398 (1941).
146. See Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Commissioner, 350 U.S. 46 (1955), apparently the
only case in which the Supreme Court used "loophole plugging" as an express basis for
deciding a case, even though the concept appears to be unnecessary to the result.
147. It appears that this concept, the gist of which is that similarly situated taxpayers
should pay the same amount of taxes, has been alluded to exactly once in federal income tax
litigation. In Kampel v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 827 (1979), the Tax Court held a wealthy
taxpayer bound by Treasury regulations that limited his partnership service income subject
to the maximum tax (pursuant to section 1348) to 30% of his partnership distributive share,
including his "guaranteed payments" as described in section 707(c):
Finally, petitioners argue that the result we reach violates horizontal equity by
affording to a partner who receives a guaranteed payment less favorable tax
treatment than that accorded a salaried employee performing similar services for
the partnership. In many cases, however, the guaranteed payment will be no less
subject to section 1348 than is the salary. Assuming other section 1348 require-
ments are met, a guaranteed payment is subject in its entirety to maximum tax
treatment unless it exceeds 30 percdnt of the sum of the distributive share and
the guaranteed payment. Petitioners have cited nothing in the legislative history
which would indicate that Congress intended to allow amounts in excess of the
30-percent limitation to enjoy maximum tax treatment. The committee reports
fail to discuss this point but affirm that the 30-percent limitation applies to bus-
iness in which both personal services and capital are material income-producing
factors. . . . Hence, our holding in no way contravenes the legislative purpose of
section 1348.
72 T.C. at 837 (citations omitted). For a fairly typical description of horizontal equity, see
Rice, Tax Reform and Tax Incentives, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 782, 788 (1969).
148. It appears that his concept of tax interpretation, the gist of which is that higher
levels of income justify higher taxes, is used exclusively in formulating tax policies and not
in the determination of tax controversies. The term "vertical equity" has apparently never
appeared in tax litigation. For a discussion of the concept, see Rice, Tax Reform and Tax
Incentives, 34 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 782, 786 (1969).
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ple, merely dance before my eyes in a meaningless procession: cross-
reference to cross-reference, exception upon exception-couched in ab-
stract terms that offer no' handle to seize hold of-leave in my mind
only a confused sense of some vitally important, but successfully con-
cealed, purport, which it is my duty to extract, but which is within my
power, if at all, only after the most inordinate expenditure of time.149
The average citizen probably has the same reaction when he sits down to
prepare his federal income tax return; and if a distinguished jurist felt
this way when the Code was substantially less complex, one has good
cause to worry.
Something is wrong. The Code is simply too complex, its ambiguities
are too numerous, and the legislative direction is too faint. Everyone,
except particularly effective special-interest groups and tax specialists,
suffers-clearly a perverse result. In the meantime, taxpayers and the
government have legitimate tax planning and revenue raising issues to
resolve, and judges have cases to decide. All these activities are hampered
to the extent the interpretative techniques used to resolve difficult cases
are unpredictable in their application. The techniques do have the dubi-
ous honor of creating escape hatches through which judges can sometimes
flee very difficult, if not impossible, problems of interpreting the nuances
of a statute that an overly busy Congress did not bother to explain ade-
quately. What should be the future of the interpretative devices reviewed
in this article? There appears to be no single answer, but perhaps the
following analysis is a fair one.
First, the reenactment doctrine clearly offers no legal stability except
for cases in which Congress in fact contemplated and approved an inter-
pretation. It should be eliminated. Second, the concept of "traps for the
unwary" has also been badly tormented; it might be a reasonable inter-
pretative tool, however, if uniformly respected. But even if it were widely
accepted, its meaning would still have to be sharpened in order to clarify
when a trap should be considered sufficiently serious to merit rejection of
a potential interpretation of the Code. Absent such improvement, the
concept offers only confusion and judicial evasion. In the present circum-
stances, it seems well worth discarding. The putative cost of abandoning
the doctrine is only an enlarged judicial burden, but that burden seems
well outweighed by the potential benefits of forcing decision on rational
grounds such as equity and administrative stability.
Third, while symmetry should not be used to subvert even a faint
legislative direction, it is a legitimate tool for filling voids. For example,
once a term has been defined in the Code, everyone's task is eased if that
term is used in a consistent manner. Certainly, the application of greater
symmetry to tax accounting would produce a revenue loss during the
transition phase, but the result would be abundantly greater fairness to
taxpayers and a more accurate measure of income. The potential list of
benefits seems endless, and the inequity invisible.
149. Hand, Thomas Walter Swan, 57 YALE L.J. 167, 169 (1947).
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Fourth, respect for legislated conditions appears to be no more than
a makeweight justification which relies on the silly presumption of an un-
stated legislative intent. It is, therefore, only a judicial escape hatch. It
should be sealed since it offers the opposite of legal stability. If the doc-
trine is not eliminated, the courts could view themselves as free to adopt
the technique and to drop the pretense of a presumed intent. If the tech-
nique were precise enough to give taxpayers and the government a clear
understanding of when it would apply, it would have the merit of filling
an occasional legal void in a predictable manner. It would nonetheless be
a substitute for logic, and whether it is necessary at all seems open to
debate.
Fifth, the bias against deductions and capital gains that results from
the failure to place the burden on the draftsmen of the statute is fixed
and predictable. No overwhelming reason exists for reversing the current
judicial stance on the issue; therefore, the best answer seem to be to leave
matters as they are. The status quo still leaves large portions of the Code
without such crude but practical guidance. For those areas, the solution
is, of course, to start with a search for the legislature's intent, which is
essentially what the implicit reversal of Gould50 accomplished. In other
words, the status quo appears tolerable, but it does not solve the
problems of how to fill the remaining logical cavities in the tax law. Sim-
plistic answers to that problem include either returning to Gould's anti-
government posture or taking the opposite view that the Code is, after all,
a revenue statute that should be interpreted to maximize revenue, a posi-
tion sometimes taken at the state level.251 The former rule would vitiate
fair regulations, but the latter rule is unpalatable for the opposite reason.
There seems to be no equitable, simple solution; accordingly, the task is
to expand the search for legitimate devices for filling the voids in the
Code.
Finally, the presumptive correctness of regulations deserves to be ex-
purgated. Recently promulgated regulations should be scrutinized closely
and held to high standards of good sense, fairness, administrability, and
whatever rational standards, including symmetry, that can be brought to
bear upon them. Thereafter, their weight should grow in accordance with
the mandates of legal stability. In that regard, "contemporaneousness"
with the statute seems to merit some weight, although less than that ac-
corded to the simple passage of time. In brief, the inquiry in this area
should focus on concepts of tax administration, rather than on a search
for talismans.
CONCLUSION
This article has reviewed selected interpretative techniques used in
construing the Internal Revenue Code. It is impossible, however, not to
suggest a few broad reforms. First, the Congressional committees respon-
150. See text accompanying notes 106-22 supra.
151. See Dostal's Inc. v. Wright, 129 Vt. 322, 277 A.2d 125 (1971).
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sible for tax legislation must explain the purposes and scope of amend-
ments to the Code as clearly as possible. If this task requires hiring a few
more technicians, then the money would be well spent. Second, serious
thought should be given to limiting the number of tax forums to one,
presumably an expanded Tax Court.152 The present forum-shopping op-
portunities commonly have the effect of inviting the presentation of tax
cases to judges who lack day-to-day contact with the Code. The result is
judicial inefficiency and legal anarchy. Finally, the incessant, clumsy tink-
ering with the statutes should be halted and time given instead to amend-
ing the Code to clarify ambiguities and to eliminate statutory provisions
oriented strictly to special interests. The last proposal, alas, seems
hopeless.
Another approach would be to admit that the present state of affairs
is parlous indeed and to try to make the best of it by acknowledging that
the Congress will probably never explain its legislation adequately and by
simultaneously tying down the various rules of interpretation so that the
parties concerned can be confident about how they will be applied. The
obvious way to proceed would be to amend the Code to include explicit
rules of statutory construction, covering, among other things, the doc-
trines discussed above. Such an approach would have the additional
benefit of meeting the requirement of the Constitution, which states that
"all Duties, Imposts, and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States,"'153 a requirement that has long lain fallow. While such an ap-
proach falls far short of curing the anarchy of innumerable federal forums
and their diverse rulings, at least it would inject a measure of certainty
into the impossible topic of federal income taxation. Certainly, it is hard
to imagine how such a proposal could make the situation any worse than
it is now.
152. See Crampton, Forum Shopping, 31 TAx LAW. 321 (1978).
153. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, c. 1.
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